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1. Introduction
In debates on the European Single Market and NAFTA some environmentalists raised the
concern that free trade might damage the environment. They argued that firms would locate
their polluting plants in countries with weak environmental policies, selling their products on
the international market. Therefore, competition could arise between governments, by means
of a strategic choice of environmental policy, to get polluting firms to locate in their countries
because  of  the  positive  incomes  that  this  would  generate,  e.  g.,  the  wage  incomes  of
workers. But, on the other hand, as pollution damages the environment each government
wants firms to locate in other countries and pollute there.
Given the above arguments, the purpose of this paper is to study how the existence of
wage  incomes  influences  the  choice  of  environmental  policy  by  governments  when  the
location of polluting firms is endogenous. It must be noted that, in developed  countries,
workers are unionized and thus wages are the result of negotiation between firms and unions.
The effect that the environmental policy fixed by governments has on the choice of firms’
location was analyzed first by Markusen et al. (1993), Motta and Thisse (1994) and Ulph
(1994a).  These  studies  do  not  consider  any  strategic  interaction  between  governments
because  they  assume  that  the  environmental  policy  of  a  government  is  given  or  that
environmental  targets  are  exogenous.  Strategic  interaction  between  governments  is  an
important question and, thus, subsequent papers focused on it.
Rauscher (1995), Markusen et al. (1995), Markusen (1997), Ulph and Valentini (1997)
and Hoel (1997) assume that environmental policy is an endogenous variable and, thus, there
is  strategic  interaction  between  governments.  These  studies  consider  taxes  as  the  only
environmental policy tool. The taxes chosen by governments affect not only to the location of
firms but also environmental damage in their countries. Therefore, when each government3
chooses its environmental policy a trade off is present. On the one hand, when firms locate in
a country with a strict environmental policy they are less competitive  in  the  international
market because their marginal production costs increase. Therefore, firms might locate new
plants in countries with a lax environmental policy, which would decrease social welfare in
countries with a strict policy. On the other hand, when a government chooses a strict policy
that protects the environment by reducing the pollution level, this improves its social welfare.
The  aforementioned  papers  measure  social  welfare  in  each  country  as  the  sum  of
consumer surplus, firms’ profits, quality of the environment and tax incomes. Nevertheless,
in debates about environmental policy it is argued that social welfare  is  also  affected  by
employment. Hoel (1997)  and  Markusen  (1997)  argue  that  the  choice  of  environmental
policy by a government affects the location of firms and, thus, the employment level in its
country. However, they do not consider that the workers of those firms obtain positive wage
incomes. In developed countries labor is usually unionized, and thus wages are the result of
negotiation between firms and unions. Therefore, when labor is unionized there are positive
wage incomes and governments have incentives to choose a lax policy to get firms to locate
in their countries, since the welfare level in each country depends on such incomes.1 We
shall analyze this question in this paper.
The  aforementioned  studies  consider  that  the  policy  tools  that  governments  use  are
environmental taxes. However, in practice, environmental standards are the policy tools that
governments use to control pollution.2 Indeed, Ulph (1992)  shows  that,  in  a  theoretical
framework of strategic international trade, governments prefer to use standards rather than
taxes as their  environmental  policy  tool.  Therefore,  we  shall  consider  that  governments
choose environmental standards to control environmental damage.
Empirical evidence shows that government environmental policy influences the decision
of  firms  as  to  where  to  locate.  Thus,  Rowland  and  Feiock  (1991)  point  out  that4
environmental regulations affect firms’ location decisions in  the  chemical  industry  in  the
United States. Hettige et al. (1992), Lucas et al. (1992) and Low and Yeats (1992) conclude
that there has been a long-term upward trend in industrial emissions for most countries, and
that this upward trend is higher in lower income countries. This result is consistent with an
industrial  displacement  effect  on  dirtier  industries  resulting  from  stricter  environmental
regulations in industrialized countries since 1970.3
An  example  illustrating  this  question  is  given  by  the  case  of  the  French  chemical
multinational Elf Atochem. This firm moved one of its production plants from Lyon to Spain,
due to the more lax Spanish environmental policy. Greenpeace argued that the firm moved its
production plant due to the pressure of French public opinion. The Spanish government,
given its lower valuation of the environment, permitted the firm to locate in its country due to
the positive effects on the employment level (El Correo Español, 7-10-93).
The above example illustrates the question that we want to analyze in this paper. Thus,
we consider a single market made up of two countries and one polluting firm that has to
decide its location. The firm produces a good whose productive process pollutes only in the
country in which the firm locates. We consider that workers are unionized,  so  there  are
positive wage incomes in the country in  which  the  firm  locates.  The  existence  of  these
incomes gives each government a stronger incentive to compete for the firm. We show that
each government can choose strategically its environmental standard to get the firm to locate
in its country even if this damages the environment. In this way, the country in which the
firm locates obtains the wage incomes paid by the firm. In the absence of competition by
governments, they could choose a stricter standard.
To show the relevance of considering positive wage incomes we compare this case with
that in which there are no wage incomes. We obtain that, in equilibrium, the environmental5
standard chosen by governments, and thus the pollution level and the location of the firm,
differ depending on whether there are wage incomes or not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the
case in which there are wage incomes. Section 4 analyzes the case in which there are none.
Section 5 compares the two cases, and finally, conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2. Model
We consider a single market comprising two countries, A and B, and one firm that has to
decide in which of these two countries to locate. The firm produces a good whose productive
process pollutes, and sells it in the single market. There are no transportation costs, and no
possibility of discriminating between consumers from different countries.
In country i, the inverse demand function for the product is:
p=a - 2qik, i, k=A, B,                                        (1)
where p is the price in force in the single market for the product, a is a positive parameter and
qik is the amount of the product consumed in country i when the firm is located in country k.
The single market inverse demand function for the product is then:
p=a - yk, k=A, B,                             (2)
where yk is the total output produced by the firm when it is located in country k. Therefore,
yk= qAk+ qBk.6
Consumers from both countries can buy the product independently of the location of the
firm. Therefore, when the firm is located in country k, the consumer surplus in country i,
denoted by CSik, is:
 CSik = (qik)2,  i, k=A, B.                                           (3)
The only factor used in the production process is labor. When the firm  is  located  in
country k it contracts Lk workers with a uniform wage rate wk. The wage incomes in country
k are thus Rk(wk, Lk)= wk Lk; in the other country the wage incomes paid by the firm are
zero.4 All  workers are unionized and there  is  no  labor  mobility  between  countries.  The
technology used by the firm exhibits constant returns to scale such that: yk = Lk, k=A, B.
We consider a variant of the “right-to-manage” model of Nickell and Andrews (1983),
where the employer and the union bargain over the wage while employment is set unilaterally
by the firm. The union and the firm are both risk neutral and there is no uncertainty. The firm
aims to maximize its profit while the union aims to maximize wage incomes.
Each government has the environmental standard (emission quantity) per unit of output as
a decision variable. It is assumed that the government may implement a maximum level of
pollution which can be achieved through domestic environmental policies. When the firm
locates in country k it has to take into account the standard set in this country, ek, which
affects its cost function. When the government sets a strict standard (a low ek), the firm has
to use a production technology with a high variable cost.5 This effect is shown in the variable
cost function of the firm:
Ck(yk)=ckyk= (1 +wk - ek)yk, ck>0,  k=A, B.                                (4)7
The marginal production cost, ck, depends positively on the wage set in the country k,
wk, and negatively on the domestic environmental standard, ek. The firm takes an optimum
decision on how much to pollute. This is precisely the maximum level of pollution per unit of
output that the government of the country k permits, because the greater the pollution the
smaller the marginal cost.
We consider that environmental damage is local.6 We use a quadratic functional form to
measure the environmental damage generated in country k, denoted by Dk, by the productive
process when the firm locates in this country; there is no environmental damage in the other
country:7




2,  k=A,B.                                             (5)
The  social  welfare  function  considered  by  government  of  country  i  comprises  the
workers’ incomes and the consumer surplus minus the environmental damage caused by the
production process:8
Wik(ek) = CSik - giDk + Rk,  i, k=A, B,                          (6)
where Dk and Rk are positive if k=i, and are zero if k¹i. The positive parameter gi measures
the valuation of the environment by the government i: it can be interpreted as willingness to
pay to decrease environmental damage in one unit.8
To analyze the choice of environmental policy when there are positive wage incomes and
the firm’s location is endogenous, we propose a four stage game with the following timing.
First,  the  two  governments  decide  their  environmental  standards  simultaneously  and
independently; they can commit themselves to these policy variables, which  are  common
knowledge. In the second stage, the firm chooses its location and a technology to comply
with the environmental policy. In the third stage, the firm bargains wages with its workers.
Finally, the firm takes its production decision. The equilibrium concept used is the subgame
perfect equilibrium solved by backward induction.
3. Results
In the fourth stage the firm chooses the output level that maximizes its profit given the
environmental standard and the wages set in country k. Therefore, when the firm is located in
country k it will produce:
  
yk =Lk =
a – 1 – wk+ek
2
, k=A, B.                                               (7)
Output level decreases with wages since it increases the marginal production cost. Output
level  increases  with  the  standard  since  a  higher  level  of  ek,  implies  a  more  polluting
technology and, thus, a lower marginal production cost.
Using (7) it is easy to see that the firm’s profit, pk, the output sold in each country, qik,
the wage incomes obtained by the workers of the firm, Rk, the consumer surplus in country
i, CSik, and the environmental damage, Dk, as a function of the wage and the environmental
standard are, respectively:9
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, i, k=A, B,
where Fk is the fixed cost of locating the firm in country k.9
In the third stage, given ek, the firm bargains wages with the union. The result of this
negotiation is given by:
wk (ek)=argmax (pk - dk) Rk,  k=A, B,            (9)
                       wk
where the wage incomes and the profit of the firm are given by (8). By dk we denote the
disagreement payoff of the firm: dk=-Fk; when the firm does not produce it loses the fixed
cost.  The  disagreement  payoff  of  the  union  is  zero  given  that  there  is  “one  to  one”







4 ,           k=A, B.                                   (10)
Expression  (10)  shows  that  the  higher  the  environmental  standard  chosen  by  the
government k, the higher the wages that the firm will pay. This is because the higher the
standard, the lower the marginal production cost of the firm (ck) and, thus, the higher the
output level and the profit of the firm. As a result, the union demands a greater wage and the
firm can pay it.10
Using (10) we get that the profit of the firm, its output level, the wage incomes of its
workers, the consumer surplus and the environmental damage when the firm is located in
country k (k=A, B) are, respectively:
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Hereafter, we shall denote the government k by k (k=A, B). To simplify the analysis we
assume that the government of each country can choose either a strict environmental policy
(ek =0) to achieve a low pollution level, or a lax one (ek =e) to permit a higher pollution level.
In the second stage of the game, given ek and Fk, the firm has to decide its location. We
assume, without loss of generality, that FA=0 and FB=F, where F is a positive parameter.
Thus, the fixed cost of locating the firm in country B is higher than for country A: FB-FA=F.
We can distinguish three cases. First, when eA =eB, given that both governments choose
the same policy, the marginal production cost is the same in both countries, cA=cB; therefore,
as FA <FB, the firm will locate in country A. Second, when eA =e and eB=0, given that A
allows a higher pollution level than B, we have that cA<cB; as FA <FB the firm will locate in
country A. Thirdly, when eA =0 and eB=e, there is a trade off: the marginal production cost is
lower in country B (cA >cB since eA<eB) but the fixed cost is higher (FA <FB). As a result,
the firm will locate in country B if and only if F£Fo. By Fo we denote the value of the fixed
cost such that, given these environmental policies, the firm obtains the same profit in the two11
countries; that is,     Fo = 9e(e + 2a – 2)
64 .10 When F£Fo the firm will locate in country B since
its smaller marginal production cost offsets its greater fixed cost.
In the first stage, each government chooses the environmental standard that maximizes its
social welfare. Therefore, when the firm locates in country k, the social welfare obtained by
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where Dk
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given by (11). We assume that     gi < 11
3e2 = g (i=A, B), to assure that social welfare is always
positive. Let as denote by    Wik
eAeB (i, k=A, B) the social welfare of government i when the firm
locates in country k, given that A chooses environmental standard eA and B chooses standard
eB.
In this stage,  given  that  we  consider  two  countries,  the  following  cases  arise:  both
governments chooses the strict standard (eA=eB=0) or the lax one (eA=eB= e); A chooses the
lax standard (eA= e) whereas B chooses the strict one (eB=0); and, A  chooses  the  strict
standard (eA=0) and B the lax one (eB=e).
The first case is that in which both countries choose the same standard: the strict one
(eA=eB=0) or the lax one (eA=eB=e). As we have seen, in this case the firm locates in country
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The second case is that in which A chooses the lax standard (eA=e) and B chooses the
strict one (eB=0). In this case, the firm locates in country A; therefore, the social welfare in
countries A and B is     WAA
ee = WAA
e0
 and     WBA
ee = WBA
e0.
The third case is that in which A chooses the strict standard (eA=0) and B the lax one
(eB=e). When F£Fo the firm will locate in country B, and the social welfare in countries A
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. When F>Fo the firm will locate in
country A and the social welfare in each country is    WAA
0e = WAA
00
 and     WBA
0e = WBA
00.
To simplify the exposition of the results, we will show first the equilibrium of the game
assuming that F>Fo, the case in which the firm locates in country A independently of the
environmental standards chosen by the governments.  Secondly,  we  will  solve  the  game
assuming that F£Fo, the case in which the firm can locate in either country.
3.1. The choice of the environmental standard on the grounds of efficiency
In this section we assume that the fixed cost of setting up the firm in country B is greater than
Fo. Therefore, the firm will locate in country A independently of the environmental policies
chosen by the governments.13
Let 
   g1 = 11(2(a – 1) + e)
3e(a – 1 + e)2  denote the level of gA such that     WAA
eeB = WAA
0eB, (eB=0, e); the
parameter gA measures the valuation of the environment by A. Comparing social welfare
levels in each country in these cases, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. When F>Fo, in equilibrium, the firm locates in country A. Government A
chooses the lax standard if its valuation of the environment is low enough (gA<g1). If its
valuation  of  the  environment  is  high  enough  (gA³g1)  government  A  chooses  the  strict
standard. Government B is indifferent to the two standards.
This  proposition  shows  that  A  chooses  the  environmental  standard  on  grounds  of
efficiency.  As  F>Fo  firm  locates  in  country  A  independently  of  the  governments’
environmental  policies  because  location  in  country  B  is  too  expensive.  B  is  indifferent
between the lax and the strict standard, since neither of the two standards can get the firm to
locate in its country.
The standard chosen by A does not affect the location of the firm. It affects the wage paid
by the firm and its marginal cost and, therefore, A’s social welfare. The lax standard implies
a higher wage but a lower marginal cost  than  the  strict  standard.  Thus,  the  first  policy
generates higher consumer surplus and wage incomes. However, this policy causes a greater
environmental  damage.  When  A’s  valuation  of  the  environment  is  low  (gA<g1)  it  is  a
dominant strategy for A to choose the lax standard, because the greater consumer surplus and
wage incomes offset the greater environmental damage. If gA³g1 the result is reversed.14
3.2. Strategic interaction between governments
In this section we assume that F£Fo; i. e., the fixed cost of locating the firm in country B is
low. Therefore, depending on the governments’ standards, the firm could decide to locate in
country B.
Let     g2 = 8
3e2  denote  the  level  of  gA  such  that     WAB
0e = WAA
ee ,  and
  
g3 = 11 (a – 1 + e)2–3(a – 1)2
3e2(a – 1 + e)2
 
denote the level of gB such that     WBA
00 = WBB
0e . Comparing the
social welfare levels obtained in the cases analyzed above we can identify the following three
zones. Zone I groups the values of gA and gB such that gA£ g2 when gB£ g3 and gA£ g1
when gB>g3. Zone II is formed by the values of gA and gB such that g1<  gA and g3<  gB.
Finally, zone III groups the values of gA and gB such that g2< gA and gB£ g3.11 These three
zones are shown in figure 1, which illustrates the following result.
Proposition 2. When F£Fo, in equilibrium, in zone I the firm locates in country A, whose
government chooses the lax standard. In zone II both governments choose the strict standard
and  the  firm  locates  in  country  A.  Finally,  in  zone  III  the  firm  locates  in  country  B,
government A chooses the strict standard and government B the lax one.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
As figure 1 shows, in zone I, the firm locates in country A, since its government chooses
the lax standard. This standard implies a higher wage and a lower marginal production cost
than the strict one. As a result, the lax standard  generates  higher  consumer  surplus  and
workers’ incomes than the strict one. But, on the other hand, the lax standard causes greater15
damage to the environment. In this zone, A prefers the lax standard. Therefore, even if B
chooses the lax standard too, as the cost of locating the firm in this country is positive, the
firm will always locate in country A.
In zone I, when gA£g1 there is no strategic interaction between the governments. As A´s
dominant strategy is to choose the lax standard, the firm will never locate in country B. When
g1<gA£g2 there is strategic interaction between the governments. In this case, given that gA is
high enough, A would prefer the strict policy. Nevertheless, if A set eA=0, B would choose
eB=e, given that gB is low, and thus the firm would locate in country B. Therefore, A would
choose the lax standard to avoid the firm´s locating in country B. In this way, the firm locates
in country A, generating  positive  wage  incomes  in  this  country.  As  A  chooses  the  lax
standard, these incomes are high since the equilibrium output level increases with standards.
The problem is that it implies that the environmental damage is the highest possible in this
country.
In zone II, in equilibrium, both governments choose the strict standard. But, as it is more
expensive to locate the firm in country B, the firm will always locate in country A. In this
zone, when g1<gA£g2 there are two equilibria: in one of them both governments choose the
strict standard, and in the other both choose the lax one. However, for A the first equilibrium
Pareto dominates the second one. If A chooses eA=0 the firm locates in its country since, as
gB is high enough (g3£ gB), B will never choose the lax standard. Thus, as in both equilibria
the firm always locates in country A, its government chooses eA=0 since the strict standard
generates higher social welfare. In this zone, A gets the firm to locate in its country, which
implies that there are wage incomes in this country (although they  are  low),  and  this  is
obtained with the lowest environmental damage possible. However, in zone I, when g1<
gA£g2, A has to choose the lax standard to avoid the firm´s locating in the other country.16
In zone II, when gA>g2, there is only one equilibrium: both governments choose the strict
standard, because  the  valuation  of  the  environment  by  both  governments  is  high.  If  B
chooses the lax standard when A chooses the strict one, the firm will locate and pollute in
country B. Thus, although by choosing the lax standard the consumer surplus is higher and
the wage incomes are positive, the valuation of the environmental damage has a stronger
weight. Then B would choose the strict standard, since in this way the firm locates in the
other country, polluting there.
In zone III, though B has the disadvantage of a higher fixed cost than A, its valuation of
the environment is lower. In this zone, A´s dominant strategy is to choose the strict standard.
Therefore, B will choose the lax one to get the firm to locate in its country, and thus obtain
the wage incomes, although the environment is damaged. Given that F£Fo, the firm will
locate in country B. As a result, although its fixed cost is higher, when A’s valuation of the
environment is high enough (gA>g2) the firm locates in country B, generating positive wage
incomes in this country, but at the cost of the highest environmental damage possible.
The  literature  on  the  choice  of  environmental  policy,  when  the  location  of  firms  is
endogenous,  does  not  consider  that  there  are  positive  wage  incomes.  To  show  the
significance of this assumption, we shall compare the case in which there are positive wage
incomes with the case in which there are no such incomes. The first case has been analyzed
in the foregoing section. We shall consider the second case below.12
4. The choice of environmental standards when there are no wage incomes
In this section we assume that the wage is zero to focus on the case in which there are no
wage incomes. We propose a three stage game. In the first  stage,  the  two  governments
decide their environmental standard simultaneously and independently. In the second stage,17
given the standard chosen by each government, the firm decides on its location and on a
technology to comply with the environmental standard. Finally, in the third stage, the firm
takes its production decision.
In the last stage the firm chooses the output level that maximizes its profit. When the firm
locates in country k, in equilibrium, the firm’s profit and the output sold in each country are
given by (8), assuming that wk=0.
In the second stage, the firm decides its location. As we saw in section 3, when the two
governments choose the same standard or when A chooses the lax standard and B the strict
one, the firm always locates in country A. The firm locates in country B only when eA =0,
eB=e and F£F1; where F1 is the value of the fixed cost such that, given these standards, the
firm obtains the same profit in the two countries; that is, 
   F1 = e(e + 2a – 2)
4 . When F>F1 the
firm locates in country A.
In the first stage each government chooses the standard that maximizes its social welfare.
If the firm locates in country k, the social welfare function considered by the government of
country i is given by (6) assuming that wk=0. We assume that     gi < 1
e2 = g, i=A, B, to assure
that social welfare is always positive. There are two countries and two standards; thus, the
following cases arise.
The first case is that in which both governments choose the same standard: the strict one
(eA=eB=0) or the lax one (eA=eB=e). In this case, the firm locates in country A, and the























The second case is that in which A chooses the lax standard and B chooses the strict one
(eA=e, eB=0). In this case the firm locates in country A, and the social welfare in countries A
and B is     WAA
ee = WAA
e0
 and     WBA
ee = WBA
e0.
  The last case is that in which A chooses the strict standard and B the lax one (eA=0,
eB=e). If F>F1 the firm locates in country A and the social welfare in countries A and B is
   WAA
0e = WAA
00
 and     WBA
0e = WBA
00. If F£F1 the firm locates in country B and the social welfare in











Next we solve the first stage of the game when F>F1. In this case, the firm will locate in
country  A  independently  of  the  standards  chosen  by  the  two  governments.  Let
   g4 = 2(a – 1) + e
e(a –1 + e)2 denote the level of gA such that     WAA
eeB = WAA
0eB (eB=0, e). Comparing  the
social welfare levels in each country in the above cases, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. When F>F1 and there  are  no  wage  incomes,  in  equilibrium,  the  firm
locates in country A. When gA< g4 (gA³ g4) government A chooses the lax (strict) standard.
Government B is indifferent to the two standards.
This  proposition  shows  that,  in  this  case,  there  is  no  strategic  interaction  between
governments. As F>F1 the firm locates in country A independently of the standards chosen
by the two governments since it is too expensive to locate the firm in country B. When A’s
valuation of the environment is low (gA<g4) it is a dominant strategy for A to choose the lax
standard. The reason is that the greater consumer surplus offsets the greater environmental
damage. If gA³ g4 the result is reversed.19
Next we solve the first stage of the game when F£F1. It is easy to see that in this case
   WBA
00 = WBB
0e
 for gB=g4 and    WAB
0e > WAA
ee . Comparing the social welfare levels in the different
cases analyzed, we can identify the following four zones. Zone I´ groups the values of gA
and gB such that gA£g4 and gB³g4. Zone II´ is formed by the values of gi such that gi>g4,
i=A, B. Zone III´ groups the values of gi such that gi>g4, i=A, B. Finally zone IV´ is formed
by the values of gA and gB such that gA³g4 and gB£g4. These four zones are shown in the
figure 2, which illustrates the following result.
Proposition 4. When F£F1 and there are no wage incomes, in equilibrium, in zone I´ the
firm locates in country A, eA=e and eB=0. In zone II´ both governments choose eA=  eB=0
and the firm locates in country A. In zone III´ there are two equilibria. In one of them eA=e,
eB=0 and the firm locates in country A; in the other eA=0, eB=e and the  firm  locates  in
country B. Finally, in zone IV´ the firm locates in country B, eA=0 and eB=e.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
In zone I´, the firm always locates in country A, since its government chooses the lax
standard. This standard generates a lower marginal production cost and a higher consumer
surplus  than  the  strict  one.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  lax  standard  causes  greater
environmental damage than  the  strict  one.  Given  that  in  this  zone  A’s  valuation  of  the
environment is low enough, A prefers the lax standard since the consumer surplus has a
higher weight than the environmental damage in its social welfare function. However, as gB
is high enough, B prefers the strict standard to avoid the  firm´s  locating  in  its  country.20
Therefore, in this zone, the government  that  has  a  greater  valuation  of  the  environment
chooses the strict standard.
In zone II´, in equilibrium, both governments choose the strict standard to protect the
environment  since  their  valuation  of  environmental  damage  is  high.  In  this  zone,  both
governments want the firm to locate in the other country. But, as it is more expensive to
locate the firm in country B, the firm will always locate in country A.
In zone III´ there are two equilibria. In one of them eA=e, eB=0 and the firm locates in
country A; in the other eA=0, eB=e and the firm locates in country B. To explain the results of
this zone it must to be noted that there are no wage incomes and thus each government has
lower incentives to get the firm to locate in its country. Therefore, if one government chooses
the lax standard, the other one will choose the strict standard since it assures that the firm
locates  and  pollutes  in  the  other  country  and  the  highest  possible  consumer  surplus  is
obtained in both countries. If one government chooses the strict standard, the other one will
choose the lax one. The reason is that as both governments have a low valuation of  the
environment,  they  would  prefer  to  get  the  highest  consumer  surplus  even  though  the
environmental damage is the highest possible. Obviously each government prefers the firm to
pollute in the other country.
In zone IV´, A has a high valuation of the environment and B has a low one. In this zone
A´s dominant strategy is to choose the strict standard. Therefore,  B  will  choose  the  lax
standard to get the firm to locate in its country although it damages its environment. Given
that eA=0, eB =e  and F£F1 the firm will locate in country B.21
5. Comparison of results
In this section we shall compare the case in which there are wage incomes with the case in
which there are no such incomes when F£Fo (see Figure 3). This is the most relevant case
because, when  social  welfare  is  positive  in  both  countries,  there  is  strategic  interaction
between governments when they choose their environmental standards.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
In figure 3 we can differentiate two main areas.13 The first one is made up of zones 1, 2,
3 and 4 while the second one is made up of zones 5, 6, and 7. We analyze the first area
below.
In zone 1, the firm locates in both cases in country A, whose government chooses the lax
standard. When there are wage incomes, A´s dominant strategy is to choose the lax standard
to get such incomes, given that its valuation of the environment is low. When there are no
wage incomes each government wants the firm to locate in the other country. B enssures this
by choosing the strict standard. As a result, A chooses the lax standard.
In zone 2, A chooses the lax standard when there are wage incomes, which enssures that
the firm locates in its country and it obtains those incomes. When there are no wage incomes,
each government wants the firm to locate in the other country, if this one chooses the lax
standard (which assures that consumer surplus is the highest possible). As a  result,  one
government will choose the lax standard and the other the strict one, and the firm will locate
in the first country.22
In zone 3, when there are no wage incomes, A (B) chooses the strict (lax) standard and
the firm locates in country B. When there are wage incomes, A chooses the lax standard
since the environmental damage generated by the firm is offset by the positive wage incomes;
as a result, the firm locates in country A. When there are no wage incomes, A chooses the
strict standard to avoid the firm´s locating in its country. As B’s valuation of the environment
is lower than A’s, B chooses the lax standard and the firm locates in its country.
In zone 4, the firm locates in country A but the standard chosen by A depends on whether
there are wage incomes or not. When there are no wage incomes, both governments choose
the strict standard. When there are wage incomes, A chooses the lax standard to get the firm
to locate in its country because these incomes offset the environmental damage.
Next we analyze the second area. When there are no wage incomes and the government’s
valuation of the environment is higher than ˆ g, the government does not permit the firm to
locate in its country, since its social welfare would be negative. Only when the government’s
valuation of the environment is lower than  ˆ g could the firm locate in its country. Therefore,
in zone 5 the firm locates in country A, in zone 7 the firm locates in country B and in zone 6
the firm is not allowed to locate in either country. In zones 5 and 7 the governments choose
the standard on grounds of efficiency. Thus, as we have seen in section 4, if g>g4  (g£g4 )
the governments choose the strict (lax) standard.
When there are wage incomes, in zones 5, 6 and 7, the firm can locate in either country
since the social welfare is positive in both. Therefore, in these zones the results may differ
from those obtained when there are no wage incomes. When there are wage incomes and
gA£g1, the firm locates in country A, whose government chooses the standard on grounds of
efficiency. When there are wage incomes and gA>g1, there is strategic interaction between
the governments; in this case, there are two possibilities: each government tries to get the firm23
to locate in its country and each government tries to avoid it. Thus, the main difference with
the case in which there are no wage incomes is that now there can be strategic interaction
between the two governments, which can alter the standards chosen in equilibrium by the
governments and the location of the firm.
6. Conclusions
The  papers  analyzing  governments’  choice  of  environmental  policy  when  a  firm´s
location is endogenous measure the social welfare of each country as the sum of consumer
surplus, firms’ profit, quality of the environment and tax incomes. However, they do not
consider that firms’ workers obtain positive wage incomes. In developed countries, labor is
usually unionized, and thus there are positive wage incomes. Therefore, each government
has incentives to choose a lax standard to get firms to locate in its country, since the welfare
level in each country depends on such incomes.
These  studies  consider,  generally,  that  the  policy  tools  that  governments  use  are
environmental taxes. However, in practice, environmental standards are the policy tools used
to control pollution. Therefore, we have considered a simple model in which governments
choose environmental standards. We assume that workers are unionized, and thus there are
positive  wage  incomes  in  the  country  in  which  the  firm  locates.  We  show  that  each
government can strategically choose its environmental standard to get the firm to locate in its
country even if it damages the environment. In this way, the country  in  which  the  firm
locates  obtains  the  wage  incomes  paid  by  the  firm.  In  the  absence  of  competition  by
governments, they could choose a stricter standard.24
Notes
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1. Instead of considering unionized labor, we could assume that the polluting firm acquires
inputs through a bilateral monopoly relation with a supplier; the supplier firm is owned by
investors from the country in which the polluting firm locates. As Horn and Wolinski (1988)
point out, some industrial inputs are acquired not in conventional markets, but rather through
relations between suppliers and buyers. This would be the case when the product of the
supplier is an intermediate good that the polluting firm uses.
2. Cairncross (1995, p. 59) argues that “regulations is by far the most  common  tool  of
environmental policy”.
3. It is well known that environmental regulation has an important effect in the location of
new productive plants in the United States. Indeed, there is evidence that the 1970 Clean air
Act and the 1977 Clean Water Act Amendments were designed, in part, to limit the ability of
states  to  compete  for  businesses  through  lax  enforcement  of  environmental  standards
(Portney, 1990). Jaffe et al. (1995) show that, although new environmental regulations in
manufacturing industry in the United States will have a low effect on the firms’ relocation,
their effect will be stronger in firms’ decisions as regards establishing new plants.
4. An alternative interpretation of the utility function of workers would be in terms of the
union being utilitarian with risk neutral members and no alternative income (see Oswald,
1985)
5.  For  example,  Golombek  and  Raknerud  (1997)  point  out  that  in  Norway  firms  are
regulated  by  annual  emission  quantities  and/or  by  maximum  concentration  (emission
quantities per unit of volume). Similarly, the European Parliament has approved a law that
compels cars manufacturers to pay the cost of recycling cars at the end of their useful lives
(El País, 4-2-2000). This means that firms have a pollution abatement cost per unit of output.
This  cost  includes  any  R&D  expenses  associated  with  the  use  of  a  less  contaminating
technology, as well as the direct cost of emission reduction (see Carraro and  Siniscalco,
1992).25
6. If environmental damage were global, each government would compete strongly to get the
firm to locate in its country since each country is polluted independently of the location of the
firm.
7.  This  type  of  damage  function  is  commonly  used  in  literature  and  assumes  that  the
environmental damage is a convex function of the total pollution level. See, for example,
Falk and Mendelsohn (1993), van der Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) and Ulph (1994b). This
damage  is  exogenous  for  consumers;  they  do  not  take  into  account  the  effect  of  their
consumption decisions on the environment.
8. We consider that a third country is the owner of the firm; thus, the firm’s profit does not
enter into the social function of countries A and B. It can be shown that the results of the
paper do not change if we assume that government A owns a percentage aÎ[0, 1] of the firm
and the other country owns the rest, 1-a. The reason is that each government always owns
the same percentage of the firm’s profit independently of the location of the firm.
9. As there is a fixed cost and there are neither transport costs nor import or export tariffs, the
firm will only establish one plant. If transport costs or import or export tariffs exist the firm
could decide to set up a plant in each country (see Markusen et al., 1995).
10. We assume that the profit of the firm, when it is located in the country B, is not negative:




64 . It is easy to see that Fo is lower than this.
11. We consider, to eliminate irrelevant cases, that the size of the  single  market  is  high
enough, that is, a>1+5.8e; this assures that g2>g1.
12. If A is a developed country and B is an underdeveloped one, the firm will locate in
country B unless the fixed cost in this country is high enough in relation to the cost in the
other country. The advantage that an underdeveloped country usually offers firms is that its
environmental policy is lax, since an underdeveloped country has a low valuation  of  the
environment, and that workers are not unionized and, therefore, wages are very low.
13. The assumption that a>1+5.8e assures that     g4 < g < g3 < g and that     g4<g1< g <g2< g.26
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Illustration of proposition 2
zone I:  the firm 
locates in 
country A; e  =e
A
zone II:  the firm 
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Comparison of the results when F£Fo
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